Merging wars : Afghanistan, drugs and terrorism by unknown
T R A N S N A T I O N A L
D E B A T E  P A P E R S
D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 1
no 3
T N I  B R I E F I N G  S E R I E S
NO 2001/2
Drugs  and Democracy  P rog ramme
T
N
I
Afghan i s tan ,
Dr ugs and  Terror i sm
M e r g i n g  Wa r s
TN
I
C O N T E N T S
 Editorial 3
 The Two Wars 4
 Irreconcilable Wars
 Colombia, the Hemisphere’s Threat
 Box1: Taleban & Opium Economy
 War & Opium in Afghanistan
UNDCP’s ill Fated Interventions 9
 Alternative Development
 Negotiating the Ban
 Box2: Drugs Trafficking in the Region
 Security Belt
 Biological War on Drugs
 Drugs, Terrorism and War
 Box3: The Opium Ban
 Box4: The Market Responds
 References and Useful Websites 19
EDITORS:
Amira Armenta
Martin Jelsma
Tom Blickman
Virginia Montañés
TRANSLATION:
Anabel Torres
EDITORIAL SUPPORT:
Antonio Carmona Báez
DESIGN:
Jan Abrahim Vos, MEDIO
Zlatan Peric (DTP)
Logo Drugs & Conflict:
Elisabeth Hoogland
PRINTING:
Drukkerij Raddraaier, Amster-
dam
FINANCIAL SUPPORT:
Rubin Foundation (U.S.)
AICE (Belgium)
CONTACT:
Transnational Institute
Martin Jelsma
mjelsma@tni.org
Paulus Potterstraat 20
1071 DA Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel: -31-20-6626608
Fax: -31-20-6757176
www.tni.org/drugs
Contents of this booklet may
be quoted or reproduced, pro-
vided that the source of infor-
mation is acknowledged. TNI
would like to receive a copy of
the document in which this
booklet is used or quoted.
You can stay informed of TNI
publications and activities by
subscribing to TNI’s bi-weekly
e-mail newsletter. Send your
request to tni@tni.org
Amsterdam, December 2001
Europe and Plan Colombia
Debate Paper No. 1, April 2001
Fumigation and Conflict in Colombia
In the Heat of the Debate
Debate Paper No. 2, September 2001
All editions of the series are available online in
English and Spanish at:
www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate.htm
D r u g s  a n d  C o n f l i c t  n o  3  -  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 1 3
T
N
I
E D I T O R I A L
"The arms the Taleban are buying
today are paid for with the lives of
young British people buying their
drugs on British streets. That is
another part of their regime that we
should seek to destroy," British Prime Minister
Tony Blair said, in one of his attempts to
sell the war in Afghanistan. His statement is
an example of the distorting declarations
made nowadays, inspired by media spin
doctors to rally public opinion to support a
controversial war. Everything nasty is com-
bined to paint a black image of the ‘evil’
enemy, never mind reality.
Actually, it is Mr. Blair’s ally in Afghanistan,
the Northern Alliance, who may have prof-
ited more from the illicit drugs economy
than the Taleban. While opium poppy culti-
vation went down in Taleban controlled
territories last year, it flourished in areas
that were under control of the Northern
Alliance at spring harvest time. The rapid
advance of opposition forces due to the
massive bombing campaign and their take-
over of Kabul, by no means will end the
opium economy. On the contrary, our
expectation is rather a re-surgence of
poppy cultivation across the country. How-
ever, Mr. Blair’s statement is indicative of
the new context of the war on drugs, after
the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
In this issue of TNIs Drugs & Conflict we try
to put this new context into perspective.
The aim of these debate papers is to high-
light issues involving the global drugs phe-
nomenon, foster public debate on anti-
drugs strategies and search for alternative
policies. An intention more needed now
than ever, given that the new found link
between drugs and terrorism may be used
to justify an escalation of the war on drugs
as a proxy in the one against terrorism.
Drugs, terrorism and covert warfare have
been close allies ever since World War II.
Not only do ‘evil’ rebels use drug money to
finance their operations. Cocaine profits
have also been exploited by State officials
to support the Contra’s against the Sandi-
nista Government in Nicaragua and heroin
money to finance the Mujahedeen that
fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan. 
Today, the two major producers of opium
poppy and coca, Afghanistan and Colombia,
are in the midst of shifting counterdrug
strategies. In this issue we will look at the
case of Afghanistan, analysing the UN Inter-
national Drug Control Programme’s
(UNDCP) ill fated interventions. And while
international attention is focused on
Afghanistan, the linkage of drugs and ter-
rorism is endangering the troubled peace
talks between the government and the
FARC guerrilla in Colombia. 
The US State Department has identified
the FARC as a terrorist organisation and as
a ‘narco-guerrilla’, because they control a
large part of the coca growing areas and
tax coca production. Consequently,
Colombians will have less opportunities to
define their armed conflict in political
terms and be pressured into redefining it in
criminal terms, and face military escalation.
Both countries have been subject to
attempts to start a biological front against
drug cultivation. Sponsored by the UNDCP,
the US and the United Kingdom, scientists
have developed killer fungi to destroy
opium poppy and coca bush. In Colombia
the attempt was stalled due to wide spread
resistance, because of risks for the environ-
ment, legal crops and human health.
In Central Asia the fungus is ready for use.
The war against the Taleban might improve
conditions for fungus protagonists to pur-
sue their agenda. Spraying the spores from
high altitudes might be presented as an
effective weapon to prevent a resurgence
of opium poppy cultivation in Taleban terri-
tories, deriving them of a source of income
by harvest time next spring.
In brief, the linkage of drugs and terrorism
can lead to scary scenarios. And, as a Euro-
pean Commission official once speculated,
maybe the present illegal nature of the
drugs trade is making the situation worse.
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In a press conference held a day after the
September 11 attacks, Secretary of State
Colin Powell urged the need to coun-
teract terrorism by attacking “its branch-
es and roots”; that is, by attacking those who
support terrorist activities as well as their
financial sources.
While, until some years ago, the general
assumption was that some states financed ter-
rorism, with the end of the Cold War and the
fall of the Soviet Bloc, terrorism has sought its
funding from other sources, among them the
trade in illicit drugs. Today, within the new
international context of the ‘war on terrorism’,
the ‘war on drugs’ moves to centre stage. 
The recent drugs-terrorism connection began
with the opium of the Taleban. Referring to the
responsibility of Bin Laden’s network for the
terrorist attacks in Washington and New York,
Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out that Bin
Laden and the Taleban “jointly exploited the
drugs trade”. In an effort to rally support for
the war in Afghanistan, Blair warned to be pre-
pared for a ‘new invasion’ of Al Qaeda’s opium. 
Smoke still billowed from the ruins of the Twin
Towers as Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives, announced the cre-
ation of a task force to combat drug traffic, the
main financial source for many terrorist organ-
isations. After releasing a new list of interna-
tional terrorist organisations, the U.S. State
Department formally denounced the link
between terrorism and illicit drugs. Testifying
on October 10 before the House Committee
on International Relations' subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere, James Mack, Deputy
Secretary of State for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, noted that “... the
same criminal gangs involved in narcotics smuggling
have links to other criminal activities and to ter-
rorist groups”.
Although in several cases direct links between
drug money and groups classified as terrorist
have been substantiated (in Northern Ireland,
Kosovo, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Colombia),
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Al Qaeda’s alleged funding with Taleban opium
is less evident, or at least it was until Septem-
ber 11. Figures on Afghanistan’s illicit econo-
my reveal that the proceeds from opium sales
netted by the Taleban plummeted between
1999 and 2001 (see Box 1), while the North-
ern Alliance’s proceeds from opium tripled dur-
ing the same period. “We will bomb their poppy
fields”, proclaimed Blair, oblivious of the fact
that hardly a single hectare of poppy was left
in Taleban-controlled regions, due to the ban
issued by the regime the previous year.
Unconcilable Wars
The anti-terrorist strategy with respect to
drugs is: less drugs, less resources for terror-
ists. As a result, the anti-terrorist war would
require escalating the war on drugs. In prac-
tice, though, the two wars are not very com-
patible. Addressing a leg-
islative panel in mid Octo-
ber, DEA-Chief, Asa
Hutchinson, complained
that the U.S. government’s
emphasis on terrorism was
allowing South American
drug dealers to introduce
more drugs into the U.S.
through the Caribbean.
Both the DEA and the US
Coast Guard have had to
displace staff from anti-narcotics duty to the
strike against terrorism. Other state officials
and independent analysts alike have also noted
that the Pentagon’s military actions in
Afghanistan and the war against terrorism on
U.S. soil may hamper anti-drugs efforts.
The anti-terrorist strategy may even be antag-
onistic with respect to the anti-drug strategy.
Within the framework of the anti-drug pro-
gramme for Afghanistan, the U.S. and the
UNDCP threatened the Taleban with measures
and sanctions against them if they did not put
an end to the production of opium, heroin’s
raw material. The ban on growing poppy
imposed by the Taleban in July 2000 – which
received such high praise from UNDCP Exec-
utive Director Pino Arlacchi – is likely to have
come about chiefly as a result of this pressure.
Now that their territory is under repeated
bombing, rumour has it that the Taleban have
lifted their ban. This would mean an enormous
step backwards in what has been regarded as
a success in the anti-drug effort. According to
recent United Nations reports, peasants in
Afghanistan are planting or preparing to plant
poppy in two main agricultural regions. Con-
sequently, a resurgence of the Afghan drug
trade is to be expected.
On October 23, The Washington Post stated
that the main casualty of the war on terrorism
against Afghanistan is the war on drugs. This
newspaper and other media have alleged that
the price of heroin has dropped drastically, and
that the flow of opium and heroin into the
West through the various existing drug traf-
ficking routes has increased. Meanwhile, the
U.S. seeks out tribal leaders willing to oppose
the Taleban regime, ignoring the links these
leaders have forged with the drug trade over
decades. Bernard
Frahi, UNDCP Repre-
sentative in Pakistan
and Afghanistan, stat-
ed in an interview that
the resurgence of
heroin traffic might
become an obstacle in
the war against ter-
rorism: “Before this war,
Osama had enough
money. Now that his
bank accounts have been frozen, what will he do?
Turn rapidly to drug trafficking through networks
that exist already”. For Richard Davenport-
Hines, an expert on the history of narcotics,
the drug trade will survive no matter how the
war against terrorism turns out.
As a matter of fact, the U.S. Congress is reduc-
ing the budget it had previously allocated to the
war on drugs in the Andean countries. Of the
USD 731 million requested for the Andean
Regional Initiative (an extension of the con-
troversial Plan Colombia), the Congress
approved only USD 625 million on November
15. It is worth noting that this cut in the bud-
get basically affects what relates to the drug
trade directly, at least in the short term – this
is what the Head of the DEA criticises – but it
does not modify one iota in what pertains to
production itself. 
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“So if you are a drug
trafficker, you might see
this as a moment of
opportunity.” 
(Michael Shifter, Inter-
American Dialogue)
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Aerial spraying, forced eradication and the
criminalisation of those growing illicit crops are
still being carried out as if nothing had changed
in the rest of the world. This is bound to con-
tinue unless the position taken by some mem-
bers of the U.S. Congress is honoured. They
insist that U.S. aid to Colombia be conditioned
on that country’s performance on human rights
and demand that the impact of aerial spraying
be assessed before deciding whether to con-
tinue or suspend fumigation. They also insist
that funding of fumigation be suspended until
an alternative development programme for
the areas sprayed is drafted. However, only a
minority in the Senate is advancing this posi-
tion and it is yet to be seen whether these rec-
ommendations will be taken into account.
Drug consumers, on their part, are being stig-
matised for “contributing to terrorism” by
using drugs. The U.S. administration’s capacity
to view reality from different angles has never
been very sophisticated. It divides the world
into good and bad. Among the latter, drugs, ter-
rorism and criminality are one and the same
thing. Not surprisingly, domestic policies have
also changed since September 11. The penal-
ties for heroin consumption have increased,
with the argument that each dollar paid for
heroin is a dollar that goes into Al Qaeda’s
pockets: a contribution to terrorism that well
deserves more severe penalties. 
Colombia, the Hemisphere’s threat
In the Western Hemisphere, Colombia is the
best example of this new interrelation of wars.
After President Bush’s speech announcing the
launch of a new crusade against terrorism,
there were no doubts that the crusade would
have repercussions for Colombia. Three
Colombian armed groups appear on the new
list of foreign terrorist organisations. This
country is also the largest producer of cocaine
and its heroin production supplies a substan-
tial part of the US market. Most importantly,
Colombia resembles Afghanistan in one key
aspect, the fact that drugs are exchanged for
weapons.
Towards mid October, Ambassador Francis X.
Taylor, U.S. State Department Co-ordinator for
Counter-terrorism, confirmed U.S. intentions
to dismantle the Colombian terrorist net-
works, announcing that Colombian guerrillas
would get the same treatment as any other ter-
rorist group. The FARC were singled out as the
most dangerous terrorist group in the West-
ern Hemisphere, together with the extremist
Islamic organisations present at the ‘Triple
Border’ area where Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay meet. On October 10, in his testi-
mony before the subcommittee on the West-
ern Hemisphere, James Mack specifically
referred to the FARC, the ELN and the para-
military AUC as groups that “... all benefit sub-
stantially from their deep involvement in drug
trafficking”. Washington is therefore propos-
ing a new anti-terrorist plan for Colombia. The
idea of the military defeat of Colombia’s ter-
rorist groups, with U.S. support in the form of
counter-insurgency actions, had already been
gaining ground in Washington before Septem-
ber 11.
Other high-ranking U.S. government officials
are following the same lead. The strategy for
the hemisphere is very similar to the global
strategy, implying the use of all U.S. forces,
including the military. Recently, conjectures
have been made about the Pentagon’s plans to
create a ‘military Commando for the Americ-
as’ in charge of defending the Western Hemi-
sphere. This task is currently in the hands of
the Southern Command, but its role and
resources have been limited until now. The U.S.
has also announced its renewal of military
assistance to the Nicaraguan Army, which is no
longer controlled by the Sandinista Party.
After the events of September 11, the FARC
have more relevance for the U.S. as a terror-
ist group than as a drug-dealing one. From
either perspective, what is sought is its elimi-
nation. But if the emphasis is laid on the FARC’s
terrorism, with funding clearly channelled in
this direction, the war on drugs, particularly in
what pertains to drug trafficking, could suffer
the consequences. Annihilating the FARC
would not mean annihilating Colombia’s drug
traffic; not by a long shot. It is not the FARC
but the various drug cartels operating in the
country that are the true motor behind the
drug business. No definite proof linking this
guerrilla group with the international drug
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trade exists, although some evidence does
point in that direction. 
At the end of October, in a public address enti-
tled “The New Relations between U.S. and
Colombia”, the U.S. Ambassador in Colombia,
Anne Patterson, stated directly and unequivo-
cally that her country’s new global strategy
would have serious repercussions on its rela-
tions with Colombia. The Ambassador high-
lighted Plan Colombia as “... the most effective
anti-terrorist strategy we could possibly
design”. Patterson expressed concern about
the existence of the demilitarised zone under
FARC control and the presence within it of for-
eigners linked with ter-
rorist organisations. She
also warned that heroin
providers might move to
Colombia because of the
crisis in Asia, in order to
keep supplying their
international clients. With
her speech, the North
American Ambassador
bluntly erased the dis-
tinction between the
counter-narcotics effort
and counter-insurgency,
which had been official
policy up until then.
In addition to this change in US policy there is
the sudden shift of the European Union with
regard to the peace process in Colombia. Two
events caused serious irritation with EU coun-
tries, jeopardising their previous constructive
attitude to Colombia’s peace process. First,
there was the kidnapping of three German
GTZ technicians (now released), which was
considered as a slap in the face. Then, the cap-
ture of three IRA members who allegedly had
taken part in training activities in the demili-
tarised zone, erased doubts about links of the
FARC with international organisations consid-
ered as terrorist groups. It is worth pointing
out that the IRA has been excluded from the
State Department list of terrorist organisa-
tions, because it has agreed to a cease-fire and
is in the process of a peace negotiation. 
The announcement by the U.S. that it would
request the extradition of Colombian guerril-
la leaders currently involved in the peace nego-
tiations with the Colombian government was
another cold shower for the already frail and
problem-ridden peace process. The key argu-
ment is that a peace process cannot be viable
if one of its spokespersons is in danger of being
extradited to the U.S. The guerrilla rejects
extradition. Simply reducing the guerrilla to a
criminal organisation and expose them as drug
traffickers, will not encourage basic conditions
of trust in the peace process. As a result, the
threat to extradite the guerrilla leadership as
drug traffickers reduces the possibility of
involving the guerrilla in
finding a solution to the
drug problem. 
Now, more than ever,
war and peace in
Colombia are in the
crossfire of the U.S. anti-
terrorist war. If there
were any doubts, the
measures taken by the
U.S. government and the
many statements issued
by high-ranking govern-
ment officials during the
past weeks abruptly dis-
pelled them. The 11th of
September has encouraged hard-line sectors in
both Washington and Bogota in their effort to
shift the general perception of the FARC as an
insurgent movement to that of a terrorist
organisation financed by the international drugs
market. 
The role of Colombia in the international war
against terrorism, as well as the advances,
obstacles and implications of the peace
process, will be important topics of discussion
between the Colombian and the U.S. govern-
ments. The pressure on Colombia to abandon
its peace talks in favour of a military solution
is mounting. Colombia has turned into the main
threat to hemispheric security. Colombians
will have less and less time to define their
armed conflict in political terms and be pres-
sured, instead, into redefining their conflict in
criminal terms in the midst of a military esca-
lation. 
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"One of the biggest
bastions of terrorism is
not a world away, but
right under our nose. A
two-hour flight south
from Miami will land you
in Colombia, the most
dangerous and terroristic
country in the world."
(Zell Miller, US Senator) 
The extent to which the Taleban regime
relied on the opium economy has often
been overestimated. ‘Best guesstimates’
about Taleban earnings are based on
UNDCP figures on number of hectares
planted, yield per hectare, price per kg
opium, and the imposed tax rules. None of
these are hard facts. Yield figures vary wide-
ly per region and huge differences exist
between irrigated and rain-fed poppy fields.
Price per kilo in the North is never the same
as in the South and easily doubles or halves
within each district according to quality. 
1999 holds the record in Afghan opium pro-
duction of 4600 tons, harvested from 91,000
planted hectares with a national average
yield estimated at 50.4 kg/ha and sold at an
average of US$ 58 per kilo. Total farmgate
value of opium production came at US$ 251
million. The Taleban has levelled the ‘usher’
10% tax on all agricultural production
including opium, and sometimes manages
to collect additional taxes from traders. This
would bring Taleban earnings for the top
year at somewhere between US$ 30-45 mil-
lion. The following year, in 2000, production
was down to 3300 tons from 82,000 hectares
with yields dropped to an average 35.7
kg/ha (rain-fed fields only reached 18.5
kg/ha) and prices had fallen to US$ 30 per
kilo. Total farmgate value in 2000 amount-
ed thus to only US$ 91 million. With pro-
duction down to only 185 tons in 2001, but
very high prices, UNDCP still estimates
potential gross income from the sale of fresh
opium by farmers around US$56 million,
but most of that was earned and taxed in
Northern Alliance controlled territory. Since
the ban, Taleban earnings from opium were
practically down to zero.
The figures are very low compared to the
many billions that are earned higher up in
the commodity chain with trafficking and
street sale of processed heroin. There are no
examples documented that connect the
Taleban directly with international heroin
trafficking. Such allegations do exist against
Juma Namangani of the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, and against Hajji Bashar,
both operating in Afghanistan in alliance
with the Taleban. On Northern Alliance side,
similar allegations have been reported
against ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid
Dostum, who joined the alliance earlier this
year. To what extent other heroin trafficking
rings might support any of the factions in a
substantial way, like what happened during
the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s with clear-
ance from the CIA and Pakistan intelligence,
is today a largely unknown factor. Including
the DEA has to rely on very vague language
to argue an alleged connection between
drugs and terrorism in the case of  Taleban,
Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network:
“Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm
that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, the
relationship between the Taliban and Bin Laden
is believed to have flourished in large part due to
the Taliban’s substantial reliance on the opium
trade as a source of organizational revenue.
While the activities of the two entities do not
always follow the same trajectory, we know that
drugs and terror frequently share the common
ground of geography, money, and violence. In this
respect, the very sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden
is based on the existence of the Taliban’s support
for the drug trade. This connection defines the
deadly, symbiotic relationship between the illicit
drug trade and international terrorism.”
Taleban opium earnings are also low when
compared to their other main illicit source
of income: large scale regional contraband
of regular goods, either flown in directly
from duty-free Dubai and then smuggled to
neighbouring countries, or diverted from
tax-exempted transit shipments through
Pakistan under the Afghan Transit Trade
Agreement (ATTA). A World Bank study esti-
mated this contraband trade to be worth
US$ 2.5 billion in 1997 and that the Taleban
derived at least US$ 75 million from it.
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W A R  &  O P I U M  I N  A F G H A N I S TA N
U N D C P ’ S  I L L  F AT E D  I N T E R V E N T I O N S  
Afghanistan has been the centre
of attention for the United
Nations International Drug Con-
trol Programme (UNDCP) since it became
clear that the country had gained the status of
the world’s largest source of opium. Since
1994, the Annual Opium Poppy Survey of
UNDCP’s Crop Monitoring Programme is the
most reliable source for figures on poppy
hectares and opium production potential. To
understand the complexities of the Afghan
opium economy, UNDCP’s Strategic Study Series
is indispensable. It has documented the expan-
sion of poppy fields in Afghanistan and the rea-
sons behind it; the role of opium as a source
of credit and in livelihood strategies of small
farmers and war refugees; the role of women
in the opium economy and the rural dynamics
behind the illicit trade. 
Unfortunately, this accumulated wisdom seems
absent in the planning and implementation of
UNDCP projects that aimed to stem the flow
of illicit drugs from Afghanistan. The policy
interventions have been highly politicised and
every one of them has been plagued by con-
troversy. The following reconstruction of
UNDCP’s troubled efforts casts serious doubt
about the ability of this agency to play a con-
structive role in the crucial political moment
today, where the drugs-and-war nexus in
Afghanistan has come to the attention of the
entire international community.
Alternative Development
By 1989, once Soviet troops had left
Afghanistan on February 15, UN agencies were
conscious of the potential increase of illicit
opium production. It had grown steadily over
the past few years already reaching an output
of 1200 metric tons, roughly one-third of glob-
al production. The countryside was devastat-
ed and millions of refugees were starting to
return to their home villages. Integration into
the established opium economy was their best
option to survive. To counter this threat
UNDCP launched its first Alternative Devel-
opment project in June 1989. This Afghanistan
Drug Control and Rural Rehabilitation project
(AD/AFG/89/580), with a total budget of
US$9.2 million, would last until March 1996.
Across the major poppy growing provinces,
over 200 small drug control development pro-
jects were initiated as part of the overall inter-
national rehabilitation and reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan. The only common ele-
ment in the package of scattered projects and
the only difference with the many other rural
reconstruction efforts implemented by other
agencies, was the ‘poppy clause.’ Prior to the
start of a project communities had to sign an
agreement to end opium cultivation. Enforcing
this clause, however, proved to be impossible.
Between 1989 and 1994 opium production
nearly tripled to 3400 tons.  Evaluations of the
programme did recognize its contribution to
overall rehabilitation of the countryside, but
acknowledged its failure in terms of reducing
poppy crops.
In March 1997 a second initiative was launched
in the form of a pilot project: the Poppy Crop
Reduction Project (AD/AFG/97/C28), with a
total budget aim of US$ 12.5 million for the
1997-2001 project period. It was financed by
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the USA,
but never reached the target amount. A more
focussed intervention was planned in four spe-
cific districts (three in Qandahar and one in
Nangarhar province), aiming to improve con-
ditions for alternative incomes for farmers
through a range of activities: “Activities will
include introduction of alternatives to poppy based
cropping systems, rehabilitation of karez and canal
irrigation systems (including the Nangarhar canal),
road improvement, flood protection, introduction of
a rural credit system, improvement of veterinary
and animal husbandry services, rehabilitation of the
Qandahar wool factory and electricity substation,
promotion of opportunities for self-employment and
small-scale commercial enterprises, skill enhance-
ment through an apprentice scheme, establishment
of schools and health, drinking water supply and
improved sanitation facilities and training pro-
grammes for women in basic family health and live-
stock production.” 
The ‘poppy clause’ in this programme was
implemented through Drug Control Action
Plans (DCAPs). Local authorities and commu-
nity representatives had to commit themselves
to full elimination of illicit crops in the project
period. “Under its conditionality policy, UNDCP will
provide development assistance only if a ban on
opium poppy cultivation has been declared at dis-
trict level and that the concerned authorities at
provincial, district and village levels have commit-
ted themselves to enforce such ban.” The DCAPs
recognized the necessity of a four year grad-
ual reduction scheme, but failed to specify any
relationship between achieving development
targets and diminishing illicit crops. In spite of
the pilot status of the programme, the DCAP
reduction timetables did not allow any flexi-
bility to build confidence with the involved
communities. Instead they pressured them -in
vain- to comply with schedules that did not
take into account survival necessities or lessons
learned elsewhere. In Pakistan, similar efforts
had taken 8-12 years to reach sustainable
results. While the UNDCP Strategic Study Series
collected data and new insights about house-
hold decision making on poppy planting, the
role of women in the opium economy and the
importance of opium as a credit facility, this did
not lead to any adaptations in the programme.
Towards the end of 2000 the project was
abruptly ended. Only about US$ 3 million had
actually been spent in the four districts. Donor
enthusiasm had ran out because of critical
reviews about its impact, political inconve-
nience about dealing with Taleban authorities,
and an internal management crisis in UNDCP
involving Executive Director Pino Arlacchi. At
the time evaluations concluded that opium
poppy was indeed significantly reduced by
2000, particularly in the Qandahar districts.
However, no  causal relationship with the pro-
ject activities could be confirmed. A severe
drought was the main cause of the fall in plant-
ed area and yield, a pattern shown as well in
districts outside of the project coverage.
The pilot project failed to meet its original key
targets, one of which was stated as: “The pro-
ject will demonstrate to the Afghan authorities that
a poppy ban can be sustained without due hard-
ship when supported with a programme to help
poppy growing areas along an alternative path of
socio-economic development.” Rising production
patterns, disappointment over drug control
impact of Alternative Development pro-
grammes, donor reluctance and a change in
leadership shifted UNDCP closer to a depen-
dency on law enforcement. Emphasis was laid
on developing an efficient method of forced
eradication, negotiate a complete opium ban
with Taleban authorities and close off
Afghanistan’s borders. Alternative Develop-
ment became a negotiating tool to achieve a
reduction through repressive means.
Negotiating the Ban
In the one-year lapse between ending the first
Alternative Development programme in 1996
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and starting the second, the Taleban gained
control over Nangarhar province and the cap-
ital Kabul. The southern opium producing
provinces were already under their control
since 1995. Given the ‘conditionality principle’ in
the pilot project, this meant entering into
negotiations with the Taleban as the de-facto
authorities. In November 1996 the new gov-
ernment in Kabul issued its first statement on
the issue. The Taleban declared their opposi-
tion to the production, processing, trafficking
and abuse of opium and pledged their deter-
mination to take all necessary measures, in the
context of regional cooperation and interna-
tional assistance. The delicate mission to nego-
tiate the terms of this pledge was assigned to
Giovanni Quaglia who represented UNDCP in
talks with Taleban authorities in 1997. UNDCP
made clear that it was willing to channel aid and
investment into Afghanistan but that it would
get the green light only if the Taleban leader-
ship would issue a public edict declaring that
opium cultivation is a violation of Islamic law,
and would co-operate actively in eliminating
poppy crops in areas under their control. Mr
Quaglia explained to the press: "We have told
them, 'We give you one, and you give us one back’.
This is the language of business. Taleban are
Afghans and all Afghans are traders. This is the lan-
guage they understand. Taleban has been told that
silence is complicity. It already has a serious inter-
national image problem, and the time has now
come for the leadership to make clear to the world
its policy on drugs."
On September 10, 1997, the Taleban Ministry
of Foreign Affairs issued the required declara-
tion: “The Islamic State of Afghanistan informs all
compatriots that as the use of heroin and hashish
is not permitted in Islam, they are reminded once
again that they should strictly refrain from grow-
ing, using and trading in hashish and heroin. Any-
one who violates this order shall be meted out a
punishment in line with the lofty Mohammad and
Sharia law and thus shall not be entitled to launch
a complaint.” It was amended by a clarification
issued on October 20 which specifically banned
cultivation and trafficking of opium. 
When Pino Arlacchi was appointed Executive
Director of UNDCP in September 1997, he
took the issue as his first priority and imme-
diately travelled to Afghanistan to personally
pursue the negotiations. “In Afghanistan it is a
matter of helping the Taleban do something they
want to do anyway as strict Moslems,” Arlacchi
told reporters during his visit to Helmand in
November. He  offered the Taleban authorities
a potential amount of US$ 250 million over a
decade for Alternative Development if they
would fully cooperate in eliminating opium
poppy cultivation. Leaving Afghanistan, Arlac-
chi announced that he had solved the Afghan
drug problem. It was to become the new Exec-
utive Director’s trademark to spread around
promises without having secured any donor
commitment, leaving a trail of failed promises
and frustrated (non-)recipients. 
The 1998/99 winter season production
reached the enormous record of an estimat-
ed 4565 tons of opium, while negotiations to
enforce the pledge continued. In March 1999,
UNDCP organised a high-level meeting in Pak-
istan with nine Taleban drug control officials,
fifteen Islamabad-based Drug Liaison Officers
from around the world and representatives of
Pakistan Anti-Narcotics Forces. Experts in
Islamic Law were brought in to discuss legal
issues of poppy cultivation under Taleban juris-
diction and to argue for practical steps towards
enforcement of an opium ban. In September
1999, just prior to the new planting season and
a month before a Security Council meeting
about actions against the Taleban regime, Mul-
lah Omar issued a decree to decrease poppy
cultivation by one-third and the UNDCP was
invited to witness an eradication-show of some
poppy fields in Nangarhar. In fact, UN moni-
toring confirmed after harvest season in spring
2000 a significant 28% production decline to
3276 tons of opium. In terms of the number
of hectares dedicated to opium, however, the
decline was only 9%, the lower average yield
per hectare was caused by the drought. The
Taleban had hoped that by showing willingness
to co-operate with the international commu-
nity on the drugs issue, the Security Council
might take a softer stand in its accusation that
the Taleban were supporting terrorism. But it
did not prevent the Security Council from
imposing the first sanctions in October 1999.
Then, on July 27, 2000, Mullah Omar issued his
total ban on opium planting for the next sea-
son. Conditions at that moment were much
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more favourable to effectuate such a ban.
Prices were still low after the over-production
in the previous seasons and the continuing
drought made poppy planting a risky enterprise
anyhow. Initially, few international observers
were convinced the ban would be for real this
time. However, it was clear to most farmers
that this time planting might be punished and
although widespread repression did not occur,
several examples of arrests and destruction of
fields were reported. Given the reputation of
rigidity the Taleban had gained, the ban defin-
itively contributed to the spectacular crash of
the Afghan opium economy in the 2000/2001
winter season. The almost complete disap-
pearance of opium poppy from Taleban con-
trolled areas could only be confirmed by May
2001. 
The gesture came too late for the Taleban to
cash in on the basis of Quaglia’s 'We give you
one, and you give us one back’ or Arlacchi’s hol-
low carrot of US$ 250 million. Instead of a
reward or compensation, Arlacchi announced
in September 2000 to close down all opera-
tional activities in Afghanistan. The decision
even took UNDCP staff in the country by sur-
prise, who learned about it when listening to
the BBC. The Taleban expressed anger: “We
are wondering how the [UN] can step out of its
programme on the pretence of not having the fund-
ing,” said Abdel Hamid Akhundzada, director
of the Taleban’s High Commission for Drug
Control. “We have fulfilled our obligations. We
demand that the agreement we made should be
fulfilled up to the end.” But political develop-
ments internationally had turned into another
direction, towards confrontation with the Tale-
ban regime. In that climate, Arlacchi had not
been able to enthuse donors for major devel-
opment investments and he already was mov-
ing along other paths, for which he no longer
needed the Taleban. 
Security Belt
While the Taleban renewed their threat to pun-
ish all Afghan farmers who grow opium poppy
or cannabis, UNDCP was proposing to set up
a ‘Security Belt’ around Afghanistan to contain
the flow of drugs by strengthening border and
drug control capacities of neighbouring coun-
Roughly between one-third and half of the opium
from Afghanistan is consumed in the region itself.
Apart from widespread traditional opium smoking,
the region is experiencing a major crisis of heroin
abuse. UNDCP estimates the number of heroin users
in Pakistan at 1-1.5 million and in Iran at 1.5-1.8 mil-
lion, figures that roughly equal the total heroin user
population in Western Europe. Most of Afghanistan’s
production leaves the country in the form of opium or
morphine base, the first step towards heroin process-
ing which takes place largely in Turkey and Pakistan
and more recently in the Central Asian republics.
Heroin laboratories inside Afghanistan are on the rise
as well. This is demonstrated by the interception of
processed heroin at the Iranian and Tajik borders and
the seizure of acetic anhydride shipments destined for
Afghanistan, a crucial chemical precursor in the refin-
ing process from morphine base to heroin.
The Balkan route has been the most significant traf-
ficking route towards Europe. Huge quantities of
opium and morphine base, passing through Pakistan
and Iran, are refined in Turkish laboratories, trans-
ported via the Balkan, and sold on the Western Euro-
pean market in the form of crude heroin, ‘brown
sugar.’ On a small scale further refinement takes place
into high grade ‘number 4’ heroin, similar to the qual-
ity of South-East Asian heroin. The Silk route through
Central Asia is gaining importance, primarily to sup-
ply the expanding heroin markets in Russia and East-
ern Europe. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have turned
into substantial processing, storage and transit coun-
tries. Transshipment also takes place through Turk-
menistan, into Iran or across the Caspian Sea, into the
Caucasus to Turkey or up north into Russia.
The border regions have become virtual war zones,
where heavily armed trafficking groups are confront-
ed by militarized police forces. Especially in Iran,
where over the year 2000, Iran drug control agencies
reported 1500 armed clashes and more than 900
smugglers killed. In total over the past two decades,
more than 3000 Iranian police and military have lost
their lives in such confrontations. Insecurity has
reached dramatic levels also because of many kid-
nappings by traders to settle disputes or for ransom
in order to repay debts after traders have lost cargo to
police seizure. According to the drug control chief of
Khorasan province: “If we built the Great Wall of
China, the traffickers would still find a way to get in.
We shoot one today, and tomorrow there are two.”
Box 2: Drugs Trafficking in the Region
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tries. Arlacchi announced the plan at the Inter-
national Conference on Enhancing Security and Sta-
bility in Central Asia: An Integrated Approach to
Counter Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism,
in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in October 2000.
The next day he travelled to Dushanbe, Tajik-
istan, to inaugurate the new Drug Control
Agency which had been set up with UNDCP
assistance. “The Tajikistan projects were from the
very beginning shrouded in secrecy,” according to
Michael von der Schulenberg, who accompa-
nied Arlacchi in his first mission to Tajikistan
in April 1999 as Director for Operations and
Analysis. “Mr. Arlacchi promised the President to
finance a Drug Control Agency and to pay nation-
al salaries for three years of all law enforcement
officers. Later he added a commitment of US$ 2
million for Russian border guards stationed along
the Afghan-Tajik border. (..) The crucial recruitment
of four international inspectors has been halted
leaving the Drug Control Agency with virtually no
international supervision.”
The money largely came from UNDCP’s very
limited General Purpose Funds. The Dutch
government was not pleased when they dis-
covered that about US$ 300,000 of a Dutch
donation to UNDCP earmarked for demand
reduction projects, was actually used to buy
arms and equipment for this paramilitary elite
police unit of a repressive state in the highly
unstable Central Asian region. Arlacchi had a
letter drafted to convince the Dutch donor
that this project would contribute to demand
reduction, but was convinced by his advisors
that it was wiser to re-allocate the money to
a Caribbean drug abuse prevention project.
The Security Belt programme was intended to
gather funds totalling US$ 87 million. Due to
lack of donor support only the Tajikistan pro-
jects and -since May 2001- a UK supported
effort to strengthen drug control efforts in Iran
have been approved so far. Again Arlacchi had
been quick in promising money, but poor in col-
lecting it. Arlacchi gathered a team of intimate
-largely Italian- friends around him for his
efforts in Central Asia, who only reported to
him. Responsibility for or even information
about anything to do with activities in
Afghanistan or Central Asia was taken away
from Michael von der Schulenberg (Director
Operations) and Anthony White (Head Sup-
ply Reduction), who both left the agency in
utter frustration at the end of 2000.
An important forum at the background of the
Security Belt programme is the so-called "Six
Plus Two" Group, a regular meeting to coordi-
nate policies towards Afghanistan of repre-
sentatives from six neighbouring countries
(Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turk-
menistan and China) plus the United States and
the Russian Federation. In February 2000, this
Six-Plus-Two group took up the question of
illicit drugs coming out of Afghanistan and its
destabilizing impact on the region. UNDCP
was asked to assist in identifying a joint
response. One month later, Arlacchi briefed
the UN Security Council and a statement was
issued encouraging the Six-Plus-Two Group to
address drug-related issues in a coordinated
manner, with the support of UNDCP. The
Security Council statement also urged other
Member States to increase their support for
efforts aimed at strengthening the drug control
capacities of countries bordering Afghanistan.
In May 2000 UNDCP convened a meeting
between experts from the Six-Plus-Two Group
and major donor countries to discuss the drug
threat from Afghanistan and regional insecuri-
ty. A Regional Action Plan was approved on
September 13, 2000, largely a wish list to
increase international security and border con-
trol assistance to the Central Asian republics.
Biological War on Drugs
In February 1998, UNDCP signed a $650.000
contract with the Institute of Genetics in
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, for a 3.5 year research
programme to develop “an effective, reliable and
environmentally safe agent for the eradication of
opium poppy.” A pathogenic plant fungus was
identified capable to infect and kill opium
poppy. The project (AD/RER/98/C37), funded
by the US and UK governments, was referred
to for the first time in the Strategy for Coca
and Opium Poppy Elimination (SCOPE).
SCOPE was meant to become the Grand Mas-
ter Plan to free the world of cocaine and hero-
in within a decade by combining Alternative
Development and eradication interventions.
Pino Arlacchi promoted SCOPE heavily but
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failed to have it endorsed at the UN General
Assembly Special Session on Drugs in 1998.
The fungus project, however, proceeded as
planned.
UNDCP called upon the 1996 Memorandum
of Understanding on Drug Control Coopera-
tion, signed by all Central Asian governments,
providing the legal basis for cooperation in
eradication of illicit opium poppy in the region.
However, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
refused to collaborate in the fungus experi-
ments. The government of Uzbekistan was
willing to host the programme and after labo-
ratory testing, field experiments started in
2000 in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
with the fungus Pleospora papaveracea. The
research phase of the programme has recent-
ly been concluded. The next step is to install
a scientific panel to review its results, evaluat-
ing potential risks for environment, legal crops
and human health. Taking into account the con-
clusions of the review panel, UNDCP and the
project donors will decide whether or not to
proceed to the next stage: the deployment of
the fungus in Central Asia to destroy poppy
fields by triggering an epidemic of the fungal dis-
ease and making the soil unfit for poppy plant-
ing for many years. The real target for the pro-
ject, however, lies next-door in Afghanistan.
Arlacchi allegedly considered to get the UN
recognized Afghan Government in exile, to
agree to massive application of the Pleospora
fungus in Afghanistan.
A similar project that was intended to devel-
op the Fusarium fungus to destroy coca crops
in Colombia, triggered so much resistance
from scientists, environmental groups, indige-
nous peoples and governments from the
region, that the Colombian government decid-
ed not to allow field testing on its territory.
UNDCP had to withdraw the project plans.
The controversy sparked unrest worldwide
about the idea that a UN agency might start a
biological front in the War on Drugs, prompt-
ing also several European countries and the
European Parliament to denounce such plans
strongly. This now forces UNDCP, the US and
the UK to consider very carefully the future of
the Uzbek project, which has become politi-
cally a highly sensitive issue.
On the other hand, the current war against the
Taleban regime might improve conditions for
the protagonists of the now ready-to-use fun-
gus to pursue their agenda. Spraying Pleospo-
ra spores from high altitudes might be pre-
sented as an effective weapon to prevent or to
counter a resurgence of opium poppy cultiva-
tion in Taleban controlled territories, deriving
them of a potential source of income for their
war treasure by harvest time next spring. 
Drugs, Terrorism and War
By May 2001 the absence of opium poppy in
Taleban controlled territory was confirmed by
UNDCP. “We have done what needed to be done,
putting our people and our farmers through
immense difficulties. We expected to be reward-
ed for our actions, but instead were punished with
additional sanctions,” the Taleban’s High Com-
mission for Drug Control complained. UN
Security Council sanctions against the Taleban
were re-inforced in January, because of US
pressure to get Osama Bin Laden extradited
from Afghanistan. The international community
began to focus on the “increasingly interweaving
threats of drug trafficking, organized crime and ter-
rorism.” The Tashkent Conference in October
2000 had been the first initiative in the region
explicitly making the connection between
drugs, crime and terrorism. According to Schu-
lenberg “the outcome of this meeting has been
questioned repeatedly ever since, due the lack of
definition of what constitutes ‘terrorism’ in the
regional context.”
The UN panel installed to recommend ways of
monitoring an arms embargo on the Taleban
questioned the motives of the opium ban. “If
Taleban officials were sincere in stopping the pro-
duction of opium and heroin, then one would expect
them to order the destruction of all stocks existing
in areas under their control,” the panel said in its
report to the UN Security Council. The panel
also stated that the proceeds of the sale of
stockpiled opium were being used to buy arms
and “finance the training of terrorists and support
the operations of extremists in neighbouring coun-
tries and beyond.” The team of experts toured
the six neighbouring states to assess how bor-
der controls might be further tightened.
The Afghanistan Support Group, a regular
donor conference under the UN to coordinate
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aid to the country, recognizes the humanitari-
an drama caused by the opium ban and noted
at its meeting in Islamabad in June 2001 that its
“members were unanimous in their recognition
that it was imperative the international community
responds as soon as possible to alleviate the suffering
of those farmers and labourers most affected by the
ban.” In response, UNDCP prepared an assis-
tance plan and in August a pilot project for the
Nangarhar province was launched. A meeting
was prepared for early October to seek the sup-
port of the donor community. However, as
Arlacchi explained in October: “The tragic events
of September 11 changed the situation. UNDCP
decided to put all its activities in Afghanistan on hold
for the time being. This included the closure of the
recently launched project in Nangarhar.”
On October 16, UNDCP convened a meeting
with representatives of seventeen donor coun-
tries, of nine countries in the region around
Afghanistan and of the European Commission
to assess the situation following the terrorist
attacks of September 11. “Participants recog-
nized that the importance of the fight against drugs
in Afghanistan had gained increased urgency
because of connections between drug trafficking and
the financing of terrorism. Despite the Taliban’s
effective ban on poppy cultivation last year, traf-
ficking in Afghan heroin, drawing on important
stockpiles, continued unabated. Participants in the
meeting expressed their joint commitment to
strengthening cooperation in order to reinforce bor-
der control capacity in the region, both of the coun-
tries in the first and second ‘lines of defence’ and
to fight against drug trafficking.”
Looking to the future, Arlacchi has pleaded
before the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE Permanent Council,
1 November 2001) to apply the UNDCP’s ‘con-
ditionality principle’ to all reconstruction efforts:
“The millions that will be spent on the reconstruc-
tion of Afghanistan will diminish greatly in value if
they do not include a guarantee that opium poppy
cultivation and heroin production will no longer be
allowed. [..] I call on you to join us in an action to
prevent the return of opium poppy. This will con-
tribute to security in all OSCE countries. A reduc-
tion in the availability of illicit drugs will address an
important threat to human security in the region and
in Europe. In addition, the removal of the profits from
illicit drugs will make it more difficult for terrorists
and organized criminal groups to threaten both
human security and national security.”
Conclusion
Afghanistan today is at the centre of the world’s
attention now that the ‘alliance against terror-
ism’ is engaged in a full-blown war against the
Taleban regime. The importance of under-
standing the illicit drugs economy as a cross-cut-
ting issue touching on  security and development
issues is more and more recognized. Policy
making to address the endemic conflict inside
Afghanistan, the severe developmental crisis
and the refugee drama, has to incorporate the
drugs factor. Reconstruction of the country
and prevention of recurring armed conflict will
have to be accompanied by considerate policy
approaches towards the reality of the opium
economy as a component of survival strategies.
Implementing unsound Alternative Develop-
ment strategies, a repressive ban, risky and
ineffective biological eradication methods, or
strengthening the repressive apparatus of neigh-
bouring authoritarian regimes, may well deteri-
orate the crisis even further. The international
community has to look beyond applying the
blunt instrument of a ‘conditionality principle.’
Given the history of UNDCP’s ill fated inter-
ventions in the region and the current mal-
functioning of the agency in terms of manage-
ment and evaluation mechanisms, it seems wise
to consider an institutional UN framework for
the reconstruction of Afghanistan without a
leading role of UNDCP in the process. A wider
development and conflict resolution and pre-
vention context will have to prevail, accompa-
nied by drugs policy approaches based on learn-
ing from past failures, in which many of
UNDCP’s dogma’s need to be re-thought.
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On July 27, 2000, the Taleban authorities
banned opium poppy. The UNDCP Annual
Opium Poppy Survey for 2001, released in
October, confirms in detail the near total suc-
cess of the ban in eliminating poppy cultiva-
tion in Taleban controlled areas. “An estimat-
ed 7,606 hectares (Ha) of opium poppy was cul-
tivated in Afghanistan during the 2001 season.
This represents a reduction in total poppy area
of 91% compared to last year’s estimate of
82,172 Ha. Helmand Province, the highest cul-
tivating province last year with 42,853 Ha,
recorded no poppy cultivation in the 2001 sea-
son. Nangarhar, the second highest cultivating
province last year with 19,747 Ha is reported to
have 218 Ha this year. (..) In Badakhshan, there
has been an increase from 2,458 Ha to 6,342 Ha
compared to last year.” The survey revealed the
politically inconvenient reality that this year
80% of the total 185 tons of opium from
Afghanistan came from territories controlled
by the Northern Alliance. In absolute terms,
however, this only represented a small amount
compared to previous years’ production.
Much has been speculated about the existence
of huge stockpiles of opium remaining from
the record harvests of previous years. Many
commentators alleged that the ban also was
intended to restore market prices. There is no
doubt that the 1999 and 2000 figures repre-
sented an over-production for the opium and
heroin markets. Indeed, by harvest time 2000,
fresh opium prices had bottomed to US$ 30 per
kilo, indicating a saturation of demand. The
dynamics of the opium market, however, make
it unlikely that substantial stocks were under
control of the Taleban and that they would
benefit much from restoring prices.
One of the reasons behind the over-production
of 1999 can be found in the role opium has as
a grassroots banking system, providing credit
to farmers through the salaam system of pre-
harvest sale to traders. As explained in “The
Role of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit”
(UNDCP Strategic Study #3): “The dramatic
fall in the yield of opium in 1998, has led to
many households, particularly the most vul-
nerable, facing considerable problems repaying
their seasonal debts and servicing their long-
term debts. Given the substantial increase in the
post harvest price of opium in the south in
1998, those who purchased opium on the open
market to repay their salaam debt, were found
to be paying as much as four times the value of
the original advance given.” Many farmers
managed to reschedule their repayments to
the next season. The study illustrates with an
example of a sharecropper: “In order to repay
his marriage expenses(..) he had obtained
salaam from a trader for 14 kg of opium. Unfor-
tunately, poor yields in 1998 meant that he only
received 7 kg as his fifth share of the final opium
crop. The trader agreed to accept the 7 kg of
opium (..) on the understanding that the cur-
rent 7 kg deficit would be supplemented with a
further 7 kg in 1999.” “Increasing opium poppy
cultivation was cited by all socio-economic
groups as a means of repaying their loans.”
Especially in the south, much more was plant-
ed at the end of 1998. Combined with the good
yield in 1999 this led to the record production.
Much of the over-production thus went direct-
ly to traders. The next harvest season showed
a downfall of prices caused by market satura-
tion, leading many farmers to keep part of
their opium stashed on their farm awaiting
better prices. The likely owners of the stocks
are opium traders and heroin producers
–largely outside of Afghanistan- and farmers
themselves. 
One of the dramatic consequences of the ban,
is the breakdown of this informal credit system
based on opium. At the end of 2000 and early
2001, some 200,000 refugees moved towards
Pakistan and Iran, amongst them many indebt-
ed former poppy farmers unable to obtain
salaam to live through the winter and default-
ing on their longer term loans.  The sudden
ending of poppy cultivation has wreaked havoc
on local economies. Bernard Frahi, head of
the UNDCP office in Pakistan, applauded the
success of the opium ban. “This is the first
time that a country has decided to eliminate in
one go - not gradually - these crops on its terri-
tory,'' and called it "one of the most remarkable
successes ever" in the UN drug fight. Sandeep
Chawla, head of UNDCP research, however
acknowledges that “in drug control terms it
was un unprecedented success, but in human-
itarian terms a major disaster,” casting doubt
on the sustainibility of the implosion.
Box 3
The Opium Ban
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The illicit drugs market in and around
Afghanistan, has been highly unstable this
year. This is due firstly to the impact of the
opium ban and more recently because of
the military intervention. When it became
clear that little opium would be produced,
prices for fresh opium increased 10-fold
compared to last year to some US$ 300 per
kg around spring harvest time, and grew
even higher to US$ 700 by early September
before the attacks in the US. These
unprecedented high prices indicate that no
huge stockpiles of opium remained in the
country. After September 11, traders and
farmers who still had stocks began to sell
and move opium and morphine base out
of the country, anticipating the counterat-
tack against Afghanistan and forecasting a
re-bound of poppy cultivation. Prices
dropped rapidly. Several sources mention
a price fall inside Afghanistan to about US$
100 by October. This is still above the level
of the past decade, when prices per kg
averaged between US$ 35-70 per kg.
Opium prices in Pakistan showed a similar
pattern of strong growth between March
and September and a decline after Sep-
tember 11. In comparison, heroin whole-
sale prices in the region seem to have
remained more stable, indicating that traf-
ficking groups are still able to provide the
market with a steady supply from stocks
held outside of Afghanistan. Street prices
in Europe and the US have not been affect-
ed at all so far.
Apart from the chaotic fluctuations in the
region caused by the panic of the war, the
big question is how the global market will
respond in the mid and longer term to the
crash of opium production in Afghanistan.
The global supply, combining the figures
from South-West Asia with South-East Asia
and the smaller amounts from Mexico and
Colombia, is compared to last year down
from 4700 tons to 1700 tons. Such a down-
fall is impossible to sustain. Either heroin
prices will rise steeply and many con-
sumers and addicts will run into serious
difficulties maintaining their habit and be
forced to find chemical substitutes, or sup-
ply will restore itself.
It is likely that opium production in
Afghanistan will resume to a certain extent.
Taleban authorities maintain that all the
rumours stating that they would reverse
the ban are fabrications. “When the author-
ity of a Muslim land asks the community to
obey a religious decree, even if they are
starving or facing a difficult situation, they
have to obey and they have to be patient.”
In case the opium ban would be lifted, the
return of poppy in territories until recent-
ly under Taleban control will be massive, as
a farmer was quoted: “When Mullah Omar
told us not to plant poppies, we did not
plant them. And when he tells us it's per-
missible, we will plant it again. He is our
Commander of the Faithful.” But even if the
ban will be formally upheld, conditions
for enforcing it have definitively changed.
In spite of the drop after September 11,
prices are still good and are likely to rise
again, providing a strong incentive to farm-
ers for planting. The Taleban regime clear-
ly has other priorities at the moment and
needs its security forces for defence tasks
instead of preventing poppy planting or
eradication operations. The planting sea-
son is in October/November and observers
in Afghanistan have indeed spotted 
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farmers preparing fields in several
provinces. 
There will be also market pressure to
increase opium production in other
places. On a small scale, poppy culti-
vation exists already in Central Asia.
Border areas in Pakistan were signifi-
cant producing regions especially until
the 1979 Hadd Ordinance prohibiting
production and consumption of all
drugs, which shifted cultivation into
Afghanistan. The same holds true for
Iran, but both countries seem to be
aware of the threat and are determined
to repress any re-bound. Global deficit
may also increase prices far away in
Burma, Laos, Mexico and Colombia,
providing incentives for growth. So far,
however, there are no indications of
rising prices there and the farmgate
raw opium price levels have over the
past years already been much higher in
comparison with Afghanistan: in
Burma around US$ 200 per kg, in
Colombia between US$ 300-400.
Supply reduction efforts over the past
decades have failed on a global scale.
One way or another, the market
arranges the displacement of crops. As
also Arlacchi has come to understand
after four years of UNDCP director-
ship and in spite of his policy prefer-
ence for law enforcement and a ‘going
to the source’ approach: “If demand
does not decrease, then any success
against illicit supply will not be sus-
tainable.”
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The connection between terrorism and the illic-
it drug trade has made the headlines after the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11. In their public
statements, leaders of the international alliance
against Osama Bin Laden and the Taleban repeat-
edly stressed that not only were innocent civil-
ians terrorised, but poisoned with heroin as well.
What is more, drug profits were also used to
finance terrorist attacks. 
With the new international context of the war
against terrorism, the war on drugs moves cen-
tre stage as well. While drugs and terrorism are
now shoved together to demonise the ‘evil’
enemy, reality is the victim. Blending the two wars
to one seriously endangers the advances made to
find a solution to the drug problem. In this issue
of Drugs & Conflict an attempt is made to restore
the facts and separate these merged wars again. 
Today, the two major producers of opium poppy
and coca, Afghanistan and Colombia, are in the
midst of shifting counterdrug strategies. We will
look at the case of Afghanistan, analysing the UN
International Drug Control Programme
(UNDCP) ill fated interventions. And while inter-
national attention is focused on Afghanistan, the
linkage of drugs and terrorism is endangering the
troubled peace talks between the government
and the FARC guerrilla in Colombia. 
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The Transnational Institute
(TNI) is a decentralized fel-
lowship of scholars,
researchers and writers from
the Third World, Europe and
the U.S. committed to create
and promote international
co-operation in analysing and
finding possible solutions to
such global problems as mil-
itarism and conflict, poverty
and marginalisation, social
injustice and environmental
degradation.
Since 1996, the TNI Drugs &
Democracy programme has
been analysing trends in the
illegal drugs economy and in
drug policies globally, their
causes and their effects on
economy, peace and democ-
racy. 
The Drugs & Democracy pro-
gramme conducts field inves-
tigations, engages policy
debates, briefs journalists
and officials, coordinates
international campaigns and
conferences, produces arti-
cles, publications and briefing
documents, and maintains a
daily electronic news service
on drugs related issues. 
The aim of the project and of
the Drugs and Conflict series
is to stimulate a re-assess-
ment of conventional prohib-
itive and repressive policy
approaches and to argue for
policies based on principles
consistent with a commit-
ment to harm reduction, fair
trade, development, democ-
racy, human rights, environ-
mental and health protec-
tion, and conflict prevention. 
T R A N S N A T I O N A L

